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Nuclear peace is a theory of international relations that argues that under some circumstances nuclear weapons can induce stability and decrease the chances of crisis escalation. In particular, nuclear weapons are said to have induced stability during the Cold War, when both the US and the USSR possessed mutual second strike retaliation capability, eliminating the possibility of nuclear victory for either side. Proponents of nuclear peace argue that controlled nuclear proliferation may be beneficial for inducing stability. Critics of nuclear peace argue that nuclear proliferation not only increases the chance of interstate nuclear conflict, but increases the chances of nuclear material falling into the hands of violent non-state groups who are free from the threat of nuclear retaliation. The major debate on this issue has been between Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neorealist theory in international relations, and Scott Sagan, a leading proponent of organizational theories in international politics. Waltz generally argues that "more may be better," contending that new nuclear states will use their acquired nuclear capabilities to deter threats and preserve peace. Sagan argues that "more will be worse", since new nuclear states often lack adequate organizational controls over their new weapons, which makes for a high risk of either deliberate or accidental nuclear war, or theft of nuclear material by terrorists to perpetrate nuclear terrorism. == The nuclear peace argument == A nuclear peace results when the costs of war are unacceptably high for both sides. In a two-sided conflict where both sides have mutual second strike capability, defense becomes impossible. Thus, it is the very prospect of fighting the war rather than the possibility of losing it that induces restraint. In a condition of mutually assured destruction, there are civilian "hostages" on both sides. This facilitates cooperation by acting as an informal mechanism of contract enforcement between states. There are economic equivalents of such informal mechanisms used to effect credible commitment - for example, corporations use "hostages" (in the form of initial setup costs that act as collateral) to deter subsidiaries and franchisees from cheating. Nuclear weapons may also lessen a state's reliance on allies for security, thus preventing allies from dragging each other into wars (a phenomenon known as chain ganging, frequently said to be a major cause of World War I). Since the death of civilians is an essential part of mutually assured destruction, one normative consequence of nuclear weapons is that war loses its historical function as a symbol of glory and measure of national strength. As a method of preventing a destabilizing arms race, the concept of minimal deterrence represents one way of solving the security dilemma and avoiding an arms race. A study published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution in 2009 quantitatively evaluated the nuclear peace hypothesis, and found support for the existence of the stability-instability paradox. The study determined that while nuclear weapons promote strategic stability, and prevent large scale wars, they simultaneously allow for more lower intensity conflicts. When a nuclear monopoly exists between two states, where one state has nuclear weapons and their opponent does not, there is a greater chance of war. In contrast, when there is mutual nuclear weapon ownership with both states possessing nuclear weapons, the odds of war drop precipitously.〔http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/53/2/258.short Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis A Quantitative Approach.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Nuclear peace」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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